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Why Kentucky Should Adopt
the ABA's Model Rules of
Professional Conduct
By

EUGENE

R.

GAETKE*

Author's Note: The Author was honored in 1985 to be
named the first recipient of the W.L. Matthews Professorship
in Law at the University of Kentucky College of Law. The award
is a memorial to the late former dean and long-time faculty
member of that college, W.L. Matthews, Jr. This Article is
offered as a further tribute to the memory of Dean Matthews
and as a challenge to future recipients of this prestigious honor
to produce during their year of being so distinguished an essay
or other work bearing upon a current legal topic important to
the state of Kentucky or the nation for publication in the Kentucky Law Journal.
The Author cannot be sure that the contents of this Article
would have been agreeable to Dean Matthews, but he is certain
that the airing of legal issues critical to the people of Kentucky
and of the nation in the Kentucky Law Journal in his memory
would have pleased him greatly.
INTRODUCTION

In 1983, after six years of drafting and lively debate, the
American Bar Association (ABA) adopted the Model Rules of

* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A. 1971, J.D. 1974, University of
Minnesota. The Author would like to thank Megan A. Wallace, J.D. Candidate, 1986,
for valuable research assistance in the preparation of this Article. The Author also
thanks his colleagues, William H. Fortune and Richard H. Underwood, for their helpful
comments on an earlier draft. The views expressed, of course, are those of the Author.
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Professional Conduct (Model Rules)' as its most recent statement
of the ethical norms of the legal profession. 2 Shortly thereafter
the ABA forwarded the rules to the states for consideration and
possible adoption as binding ethical principles. As of this writing, a number of states have adopted the Model Rules, in full
or in substantial form, 3 and several more have proposals for
4
such adoption pending before their supreme courts.

' The American Bar Association's House of Delegates adopted the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) on August 2, 1983. G. HAZARD & W. HODES,
THE LAW OF LAwYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
xxxi (1985). The rules were the product of the Commission on Evaluation of Professional
Standards, known informally as the Kutak Commission in honor of its first chair, the
late Robert J. Kutak. Id. at xxx. The Commission presented earlier drafts to the House
of Delegates for comment in 1980, 1981, and 1982. Id. at xxx-xxxi.
2 The Model Rules constitute the ABA's third effort at codifying the legal profession's ethical obligations. The ABA adopted the first effort, known as the Canons of
Professional Ethics, in 1908. The Code of Professional Responsibility (Code) replaced
the Canons in 1969 upon adoption by the ABA. The ABA intends the Model Rules to
replace the Code. For a brief discussion of the ABA's role in the promulgation of ethical
codes, see id. at xxix-xxxi.
As this Article goes to press, ten states have adopted versions of the Model
Rules: Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, and Washington. See 2 Lawyers' Man. Prof. Conduct (ABA/
BNA) No. 1, at 14-15 (Feb. 5, 1986) (Nevada and New Hampshire); I Lawyers' Man.
Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) No. 52, at 1126 (Jan. 8, 1986) (Arkansas); id. No. 44, at
961-63 (Sep. 18, 1985) (Delaware and Washington); id. No. 42, at 924 (Aug. 21, 19S5)
(Missouri); id. No. 39, at 855-56 (July 10, 1985) (Minnesota and Montana); id. No. 19,
at 445 (Oct. 3, 1984) (Arizona); id. No. 14, at 334 (July 25, 1984) (New Jersey). The
Model Rules have also been adopted by the U.S. Claims Court. Id. No. 10, at 240 (May
30, 1984).
North Carolina has adopted a version that combines several aspects of both the
Code and the Model Rules. Id. No. 47, at 1026 (Oct. 30, 1985). In addition, the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has announced its intention to adopt the Model Rules. Id.
No. 1, at 17 (Jan. 25, 1984).
To date, only Virginia has formally rejected the Model Rules. See Note, Confidentiality and Conflicts of Interest: New Guidelines for Virginia Attorneys Under the
Revised Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility, 41 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1577,
1577-78 (1984).
4 Recommendations to adopt the Model Rules or versions of them are
before the
highest courts of twelve states. See 2 Lawyers' Man. Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) No.
2, at 37-38 (Feb. 19, 1986) (Idaho and Wyoming); 1 Lawyers' Man. Prof. Conduct
(ABA/BNA) No. 53, at 1142-43 (Jan. 22, 1986) (Louisiana and Vest Virginia); id. No.
49, at 1065-66 (Nov. 27, 1985) (Connecticut and Indiana); id. No. 46, at 1006-07 (Oct.
16, 1985) (South Carolina); id. No. 40, at 881 (July 24, 1985) (Utah); id. No. 37, at 812
(June 12, 1985) (New Mexico); id. No. 28, at 630-31 (Feb. 6, 1985) (Wisconsin); id. No.
23, at 534-35 (Nov. 28, 1984) (Maryland); id. No. 3, at 70 (Feb. 22, 1984) (Michigan).
In Illinois, the state bar has recommended the adoption of the Model Rules,
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The Kentucky Supreme Court presently awaits the state bar
association's recommendation regarding the Model Rules' adoption.5 Meanwhile, the currently applicable body of law regarding
legal ethics in Kentucky is the ABA's earlier statement of profes6
sional norms, the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code).
The issues that the state bar association currently faces and that
the Kentucky Supreme Court ultimately must decide are whether
the present Code warrants revision or abandonment and, if the
latter, whether the Model Rules or some variant of them should
be the replacement. 7 It is, therefore, an opportune time to assess
what is to be gained by adopting the Model Rules and what is
to be lost in failing to do so. This Article attempts that assessment. The Author believes that the adoption of the Model Rules
in Kentucky is critical. Those rules constitute a considerable
substantive improvement over the Code. 8 Furthermore, certain
peculiarities of the regulation of professional conduct in Kentucky cause the people and lawyers of the state to stand to
benefit more than those of most other states by the adoption of
the Model Rules. 9 In fact, the Author believes that the Model
Rules' adoption in Kentucky would constitute one large step in
a much needed reform of the state's present lawyer disciplinary
process.' 0
although not their form, to that state's supreme court's Committee on Professional
Responsibility, which will make a final recommendation to the court. Id. No. 40, at 881
(July 24, 1985). Similarly, a committee of the Florida Bar association has urged the
organization to recommend judicial adoption of the Model Rules. Id. No. 8, at 191-92
(May 2, 1984) (Florida).
The state bars of New York, Oregon, and Vermont, however, have recommended
against the adoption of the Model Rules. See id. No. 48, at 1047-48 (Nov. 13, 1985)
(New York, Oregon); id. No. 39, at 856 (July 10, 1985) (Vermont).
I A special commitee of the Kentucky Bar Association has labored since late 1984
in considering the adoption of the Model Rules. That committee has recommended that
the association's Board of Governors forward the Model Rules, with some amendments,
to the Kentucky Supreme Court for adoption. See REPORT OF Ta SPECIaL CoiaMirrEE
TO CONSIDER ADOPTION OF Tm ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT OR TO
CONSIDER REVISIONS OF THE 1969 CODE 1 (Mar. 14, 1986) [hereinafter cited as REPORT].
6 The Kentucky Supreme Court adopted the Code as binding disciplinary law by
its order of November 11, 1969. Ky. Sup. CT. R. 3.130 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
KSCR]. For further discussion of the Court's peculiar adoption of the Code, see text
accompanying notes 44-48 infra.
See REPORT, supra note 5, at 1.
See text accompanying notes 13-43 infra.
See text accompanying notes 44-48 infra.
,0 See text accompanying notes 49-57 infra.
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MODEL RULES' SUBSTANTIVE

ADVANTAGE OVER THE CODE

Much has already been written about the comparative merits
of the Model Rules and the ABA's earlier effort at codifying
the profession's ethical norms, the Code.I' Indeed, the committee
that drafted the Model Rules included in its report to the ABA's
House of Delegates a comparison of the proposed rules to the
existing Code provisions. 2 A detailed accounting of the substantive advantages of the Model Rules over the Code at this time,
therefore, would be largely repetitive. Nevertheless, since the
overriding concern in adopting any new body of law should be
its improvement of the existing law, a summary of the advantages offered a state adopting the Model Rules is surely worthwhile. In the Author's opinion, the Model Rules are a
considerable improvement over the Code, both in form and
substance.
The form of the Code, quite frankly, never worked as its
drafters intended. The Code was divided into three types of
statements: Canons, Ethical Considerations (EC's), and Disciplinary Rules (DR's). The Canons were statements of "axiomatic
norms' ' '3 and served primarily as headings for the various organizational divisions within the document. The Ethical Considerations were intended to be "aspirational" statements of lawyers'
4
ethical objectives but were not to be mandatory in character .

1 See, e.g., Abbott, Proposed Changes in Rules Governing ProfessionalConduct
in Kansas, 54 J. KAN. BAR ASSN. 8 (Spring 1985); Denecke, Complexities of Modern
PracticeRequire Changes in Oregon Ethics Code, 19 Wt.nar L. REv. 621 (1983);
Riger, The Model Rules and CorporatePractice-NewEthics for a Competitive Era, 17

CONN. L. REv. 729 (1985); Rotunda, The Notice of Withdrawal and the New Model
Rules of Professional Conduct: Blowing the Whistle and Waving the Red Flag, 63 ORE.
L. REv. 455 (1984); Sutton, How Vulnerable is the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility?,
57 N.C.L. REv. 497 (1978-79); Walter, An Overview of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, 24 WASHBURN L.J. 443 (1985); Note, Proposed Model Rule 1.6. Its Effect on
a Lawyer's Moral and Ethical Decisions with Regard to Attorney-Client Confidentiality,
35 BAYLOR L. REv. 561 (1983).
12 G. HAZARD & W. HODES, supra note 1, at xxxi. The Code comparison may be
found in T. MORGAN & R. RoTuNDA, 1985 SELECTED STANDARDS ON PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY, 67-188 (1985).
" MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Preamble and Preliminary Statement (1978) [hereinafter cited as CODE].
1 Id.
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The drafters intended the Disciplinary Rules, on the other hand,
to be mandatory and state the minimum level of acceptable
conduct for lawyers.' 5 Unfortunately, the tripartite format never
succeeded in practice.' 6 A number of courts, 7 including Kentucky's, s have blurred the distinction between Disciplinary Rules
and Ethical Considerations by imposing discipline upon lawyers
violating only the latter. Similarly, some courts have utilized
mere Canons in a manner inconsistent with their purpose.' 9
Furthermore, conscientious lawyers looking hopefully to the aspirational Ethical Considerations for enlightenment as to the

I/d.

See Denecke, supra note 11, at 629-31; Sutton, supra note 11, at 505-09, 514-

',

16.
See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Action Against Prueter, 359 N.W.2d 613 (Minn.
1984) (attorney found guilty of violating Ethical Consideration (EC) 5-5); Committee on
Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Behnke, 276 N.W.2d 838 (Iowa) (court held attorney
violated EC 5-5), appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 805 (1979); Florida Bar v. Dawson, 318
So. 2d 385 (Fla.) (upholding referee's finding that attorney violated EC 5-8), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 995 (1975). See also Note, Lawyer Disciplinary Standards: Broad v.
Narrow Proscriptions,65 IowA L. Rav. 1386, 1387-88 (1979-80).
See Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. DeCamillis, 547 S.W.2d 446, 447-48 (Ky. 1977).
'
Sutton, supra note 11, at 514. In Kentucky, for example, mere Canons have
occasionally been relied upon as the sole legal reasons for finding certain conduct
inappropriate. See In re Advisory Opinion of Ky. Bar Ass'n, 613 S.W.2d 416 (Ky.
1981). At issue there was the validity of the bar association's ethical opinion that
prohibited a lawyer from concurrently representing the Fraternal Order of Police and
practicing criminal law in the same jurisdiction. The Court, in upholding the opinion,
feared that such representation would impinge upon the lawyer's ability under Canon 7
to represent zealously criminal defendants whose defense might require vigorous crossexamination of police officers. The Court equally strongly emphasized the lawyer's duty
under Canon 9 to avoid conduct that might appear inappropriate to the public. Id.
Oddly, no mention was made of Canon 5 ("A Lawyer Should Exercise Independent
Professional Judgment on Behalf of a Client") in general or Disciplinary Rule (DR) 5105(A)-(C) (which prohibits certain simultaneous representation due to conflicts between
clients) in particular.
An examination of Canon 9 perhaps best illustrates the difficulty inherent in
utilizing Canons as the basis for disciplinary cases. It provides that "[A] Lawyer Should
Avoid Even the Appearance of Impropriety." Note, however, that no Disciplinary Rule
requires the avoidance of the mere appearance of impropriety. Although DR 9-101(A)'s
heading reads, "Avoiding Even the Appearance of Impropriety," the rule itself defines
specific prohibited acts that might lead to such appearances. Thus, utilizing Canon 9 as
the basis for a disciplinary decision is to elevate the broad axiomatic heading of the
Code's ninth division to the level of a mandatory rule of minimum conduct. This clearly
was not the drafters' intent in creating the Canons. See CODE Preamble and Preliminary
Statement.
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norms of the profession have frequently found only overly simplistic generalities providing no guidance whatsoever. 0
The ABA has proposed the Model Rules in a form more
suitable to their regulatory and advisory purpose. The format is
similar to that used in the Uniform Commercial Code and the
American Law Institute's various restatements. That is, the rule
is stated, followed by an official comment shedding light upon
the purpose of the rule, its interpretation, and application. The
form is both workable and familiar to lawyers, the regulated
parties. It is also more useful and understandable to the general
public.
More important than its improved form, however, is the
substantive improvement in the regulation of legal ethics offered
by the Model Rules. The Code, quite simply, was drafted for
an earlier era, 2' described by one critic as "downstate Illinois in
the 1860s.'' 22 For example, the Code envisions law practice primarily in a simplistic litigative setting 3 and provides little guidance for lawyers engaged in counseling clients, mediating disputes,
and rendering opinions to third parties. 24 The Model Rules, in

20 See, A. KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 30-31 (1976);
Sutton, supra note 11, at 516.
2, See Denecke, supra note 11, at 621-22, 639. The same criticism had been levied
at the Code's predecessor, the Canons of Professional Ethics. See Stone, The Public
Influence of the Bar, 48 HARv. L. Rav. 1, 10 (1934).
2 G. HAZARD, ETmICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LA-w 6-7 (1978) (quoting an attendee
of conference at Seven Springs Center established by Yale University).
11 R. ARONSON, J. DEVINE & W. FISCH, PROBLEMS, CASES AND MATERIALS IN
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIITY, 511 (1985); G. HAZARD, supra note 22, at 7. Robert J.
Kutak, the chair of the committee that drafted the Model Rules, quoted a practicing
attorney as having said that using the Code "as a guide to the practice of law is like
using a valentine as a model for open heart surgery." Denecke, supra note 11, at 622
(quoting address by Robert J. Kutak, Annual Orison S. Marden Memorial Lecture to
the Association of the Bar of New York City (Jan. 13, 1983)).
24 The Code expressly distinguishes between the lawyer as advocate and as advisor
primarily in the Ethical Considerations. See, e.g., CODE EC 5-15 (representation of
multiple clients in litigation and other instances); id. EC 7-3 (distinction between advocate
and advisor in representing a client zealously). A few Disciplinary Rules are expressly
limited to the litigation context, thus implicitly suggesting that others not so limited are
broadly applicable to other law practice settings. See, e.g., CODE DR 5-101(B) (accepting
employment in pending or contemplated litigation in which the lawyer ought to be called
as a witness); id. DR 5-103(A) (acquiring a proprietary interest in the cause of action or
subject matter of litigation); id. DR 7-103 (the role of the public prosecutor); id. DR 7-
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contrast, expressly recognize the complexity of modern law practice and include specific provisions on the lawyer's role as an
advisor,2s intermediary,2 and evaluator. 27 The Code's obsolescence is also exemplified by the numerous code provisions of
questionable constitutionality after United States Supreme Court
decisions since the Code's 1969 adoption. 28 The Model Rules
generally recognize these developments 29 and expressly avoid con-

106 (trial conduct); id. DR 7-107 (trial publicity).
The lawyer as mediator also receives Code treatment in the Ethical Considerations.
See CODE EC 5-20. The Code does not expressly treat the lawyer's role as provider of
opinions for third party use.
21See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 2.1 (1983) [hereinafter cited
as MODEL RULES]."
: See id. Rule 2.2.
See id. Rule 2.3.
Most notable in this regard, of course, is the field of advertising. The United
States Supreme Court's decisions in Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, reh'g
denied, 434 U.S. 881 (1977), In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982), and Zauderer v. Office
of the Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 105 S. Ct. 2265 (1985), have
greatly circumscribed the organized bar's ability to regulate constitutionally lawyer
advertising that is not misleading or potentially misleading. Thus, the Code's approach
to advertising embodied in DR 2-101(B) is likely unduly restrictive under the first
amendment. Even the Kentucky Supreme Court's own rule on advertising, KSCR 3.135,
may run afoul of the constititutional cases in this area. For example, KSCR 3.135(3)0)
prohibits the use of illustrations other than a recent photograph of the advertising lawyer
and an "image of the scales of justice." In Zauderer, however, a nonmisleading drawing
of an intrauterine device displayed in a lawyer's advertisement was held protected by
the first amendment. 105 S. Ct. at 2280-81.
Other Supreme Court cases cast doubt upon the constitutional validity of the
Code's broad prohibition of solicitation (DR 2-103, 2-104). See In re Primus, 436 U.S.
412 (1978); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 883
(1978). The Code's constitutional ability to restrict certain group legal plans (DR 2103(D)(4)) is also in doubt. See United Transp. Union v. State Bar of Mich., 401 U.S
576 (1971); United Mine Workers of Am. v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217
(1967); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, reh'g denied,
377 U.S. 960 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
"I For example, consistent with the United States Supreme Court's developing case
law under the first amendment, Model Rule 7.2 prohibits only false or misleading
advertising. See cases cited supra note 28. The Model Rules contain no restrictions on
group legal plans, so long as rules pertaining to advertising, solicitation, and professional
independence are followed. See MODEL RULES Rules 5.4, 7.2(c), 7.3. Model Rule 7.3,
relating to solicitation, attempts to focus on one distinction between the United States
Supreme Court decisions in Ohralik and In re Primus. Ohralik upheld discipline for
solicitation for pecuniary gain. In re Primus deemed protected by the first amendment
solicitation for purposes of furthering political and social objectives. Model Rule 7.3
prohibits solicitation for pecuniary gain. It is not clear, however, that all such solicitation
is outside the protection of the first amendment. The New York Court of Appeals found
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flict with constitutional case law. 30 In several respects, therefore,
the Model Rules offer a body of regulatory law that is more
consistent with contemporary law practice and constitutional
doctrine.
Compared to the Code, the Model Rules also offer improved
treatment of some recurring, troublesome ethical areas. One
notable example is the broad and diverse field of conflicts of
interest. The Code's treatment of conflicts in Canon Five is both
scant and inscrutable. There is no express Code treatment of the
prevalent problem of subsequent representation (i.e., opposing
former clients), 3 and lawyers are left to infer what restrictions
are suggested by distinct Code limitations on revealing confidences and secrets of clients, 32 being loyal to clients, 33 and avoiding the appearance of impropriety. 34 The Model Rules, however,
expressly treat the problem of subsequent representation in a
way both functionally sound and consistent with the case law
developed in the nondisciplinary context of disqualification motions.3 5 Even the Code's express treatment of certain other con-

the critical distinction to be between nondeceptive written solicitation, which would be
protected, and face-to-face solicitation, which would not be protected. See Committee
on Professional Standards v. von Wiegen, 470 N.E.2d 838, 841 (N.Y. 1984), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 2701 (1985). See also In re Appert, 315 N.W.2d 204 (Minn. 19S1)
(discipline under Minnesota's CODE DR 2-101 and DR 2-103 held unconstitutional where
applied to attorney using direct mailing to list of specific persons, not known to need
legal services.). Thus, even Model Rule 7.3 may prove to be unconstitutionally broad.
The Kentucky Supreme Court has also extended first amendment protection to
direct mail advertising, which may be viewed as a form of written solicitation since it is
targeted to an audience suspected of needing legal services. See Kentucky Bar Ass'n v.
Stuart, 568 S.W.2d 933 (Ky. 1978). It is not clear whether the Kentucky Supreme Court
would extend that protection as far as the New York court, however, to situations
involving direct mail advertising pertaining to litigation. Cf. Kentucky Bar Ass'n v.
Stivers, 475 S.W.2d 900 (Ky. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 968 (1972) (lawyer disciplined
for mail solicitation relative to litigation but facts arising prior to Kentucky's adoption
of the Code).
"' See, e.g., MODEL RULES Rule 3.3, comment 12 (duty of lawyer to disclose client
perjury "may be qualified by constitutional provisions for due process and the right to
counsel in criminal cases").
11 See Denecke, supra note 11, at 637.
32 See CODE DR 4-101(B)-(C).
" See id. Canon 5.
See id. Canon 9.
' See MODEL
RULEs Rule 1.9. Model Rule 1.9 focuses upon the substantial
relationship between the former and present representations and the potential misuse of
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flicts issues tends to leave the reader totally puzzled. For example,
DR 5-105(C) permits a lawyer to represent conflicting interests
simultaneously if the lawyer has the clients' informed consent
but only if it is also "obvious" that he or she can adequately
represent both. In the face of such a conflict, however, when,
if ever, can adequate representation be "obvious"? That standard is both so strict and so vague as to leave a conscientious
lawyer with no guidance at all. The Model Rules deal with the
propriety of such simultaneous representation in terms of the
lawyer's reasonable belief that the conflict will not adversely
affect the attorney-client relationship with either client, a considerable improvement over the opaque standard of obviousness.
The Model Rules also expressly address the difficult problem
of professional responsibility within the law firm setting. Provisions speak directly to the obligations of partners as well as
supervisory 6 and subordinate 7 lawyers within a firm. Untreated
by the Code, this matter surely presents a problem to every
partner or associate having become aware of ethical transgressions by other lawyers within the law firm.
The Model Rules also discard some of the ethical restrictions
contained in the Code that appear to serve only the interests of
certain segments of the legal profession. For example, DR 2-107
prohibits lawyers not practicing within a law firm context from
sharing fees unless the client consents, the fee division is proportional to "the services performed and responsibility assumed" by each lawyer, and the total fee is reasonable.38 The
provision restricts referral arrangements, therefore, unless the

confidential information imparted during the former representation. Id. Courts generally
use this approach in determining when counsel appearing in civil litigation should be
disqualified due to conflicts of interest resulting from prior representations. See, e.g.,
LaSalle Nat'l Bank v. County of Lake, 703 F.2d 252, 255-56 (7th Cir. 1983) (firm
representing plaintiff disqualified because defendant was former employer of an associate
of the firm); General Electric Co. v. Valeron Corp., 608 F.2d 265, 267-68 (6th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 930 (1980) (attorney disqualified because substantial relationship shown between attorney's prior work for plaintiff, with receipt of confidential
information, and current adverse litigation). The leading case in the development of the
substantial relationship test in the disqualification context is T.C. Theatre Corp. v.
Warner Brothers Pictures, Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265, 268-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
' See MODEL RuLEs Rule 5.1.
17 See MODEL RuLEs Rule 5.2.
" See CODE DR 2-107(A)(l)-(3).
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referring lawyer performs services in the representation. If the

referring lawyer remains responsible for the conduct of the lawyer to whom a matter is referred, however, it seems that such a
referral arrangement is functionally indistinguishable from that
regularly used within law firms. Clients frequently seek legal
representation from a lawyer in a law firm and are then represented, with the client's consent, exclusively by another lawyer
within the firm. By prohibiting similar arrangements between
lawyers not working in law firm settings the Code favors one
form of practice over another with no corresponding public

benefit.3 9
Additional examples of the Model Rules' improvement over
the present Code in the substance of legal ethics regulation could
be provided. This is not to suggest that the Model Rules are

without problems. Commentators have roundly criticized the
Model Rules on the one hand as too strict an incursion into the
attorney-client relationship 4° and, on the other, as too protective
of lawyers' interests at the expense of those of the general
public. 4' Several aspects of the Model Rules, most notably those

dealing with the lawyer's obligations of confidentiality, 42 have

11Compare MODEL RULES Rule 1.5(e) (allows division of fees, between lawyers
who are not in the same firm, without regard to the services performed by each, if they
share joint responsibility for the client's representation) with CODE DR 2-107(A)(1)-(3)
(permits division of fees only in proportion to services rendered).
0 Dissatisfaction with the proposed Model Rules and the existing Code caused a
group of trial lawyers, comprising the Commission on Professional Responsibility under
the auspices of the Roscoe Pound-American Trial Lavers Foundation, to propose their
own set of ethical principles as an alternative to both ABA products. A 1982 revised
draft of the document, labeled "The American Lawyer's Code of Conduct," is reproduced at T. MORGAN & R. ROTUNDA, supra note 12, at 189-213. According to Theodore
I. Koskoff, former president of the American Trial Lawyers Association and co-chair
of the Commission, both the Code and Model Rules are unsatisfactory. Id. at 190. As
to the Model Rules in particular, Mr. Kostoff asserts, "We have rejected one concept
that the Kutak Commission apparently espouses, that lawyers have a general duty to do
good for society that often overrides their specific duty to serve their clients. Serving
clients is the lavyer's basic reason for being a lawyer, and the exceptions to the
fundamental rule of absolute loyalty to clients must be minimal, and must be strictly
construed." Id. at 191.
41 Gillers, What We Talked About When We Talked About Ethics: A Critical
View of the Model Rules, 46 Omo ST. L.J. 243, 245-46 (1985).
42

See

MODEL RULES

Rule 1.6.
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43
caused some difficulty in the adoption process in some states.
On the whole, however, the Model Rules constitute a vast improvement over the Code. They are more comprehensive, more
consistent with contemporary law practice, and better reasoned.

II.

KENTUCKY'S PECULIAR NEED FOR THE
ADOPTION OF THE MODEL RULES

The adoption of the ABA's Model Rules offers any state
presently utilizing the Code considerable improvement in the
substance of the law governing lawyer conduct. In Kentucky,
however, the adoption would have an even greater favorable
impact.
The Kentucky version of the Code is extremely outdated.
The Kentucky Supreme Court adopted the Code in 1969. 44 The

4-In fact, the primary variation among the states adopting the Model Rules has
been in Model Rule 1.6's treatment of confidentiality. To date, only Delaware, Missouri
and Montana have adopted the ABA's version of the proposed rule. 1 Law Man. Prof.
Conduct (ABA/BNA) No. 44, at 961 (Sep. 18, 1985) (Delaware); id. No. 42, at 924
(Aug. 21, 1985) (Missouri); id. No. 39, at 855 (July 10, 1985) (Montana). In addition,
the Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, and New Mexico bar associations have recommended the
adoption of the Model Rules' confidentiality provision. 2 Law Man. Prof. Conduct
(ABA/BNA) No. 2, at 37-38 (Feb. 19, 1986) (Idaho); 1 Law Man. Prof. Conduct (ABA/
BNA) No. 53, at 1143 (Jan. 22, 1986) (Louisiana); id. No. 49, at 1066 (Nov. 27, 1985)
(Indiana); id. No. 37, at 812 (June 12, 1985) (New Mexico).
The other Model Rules states adopted their own confidentiality rules which permit
or require greater disclosure of client confidences under certain circumstances. 2 Law
Man. Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) No. 2, at 37 (Feb. 19, 1986) (Nevada); id. No. 1, at
14 (Feb. 5, 1986) (New Hampshire); I Law Man. Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) No. 52,
at 1126 (Jan. 8, 1986) (Arkansas); id. No. 44, at 962-63 (Sep. 18, 1985) (Washington);
id. No. 19, at 445-46 (Oct. 3, 1984) (Arizona); id. No. 14, at 334 (July 25, 1984) (New
Jersey); id. No. 10, at 237-38 (May 30, 1984) (Minnesota). Additionally, a number of
state bar associations that have recommended adoption of the Model Rules proposed
changes to the provision on confidentiality. See 1 Law Man. Prof. Conduct (ABA/
BNA) No. 53 at 1142-43 (Jan. 22, 1986) (Louisiana and West Virginia); id. No. 23, at
534-35 (Nov. 28, 1985) (Maryland); id. No. 49, at 1065 (Nov. 27, 1985) (Connecticut);
id. No. 46, at 1006 (OCT.16, 1985) (South Carolina); id. No. 40, at 881 (July 24, 1985)
(Utah); id. No. 28, at 630-31 (Feb. 6, 1985) (Wisconson); id. No. 3, at 70 (Feb. 22,
1984) (Michigan). The Kentucky Bar Association's Special Committee studying the Model
Rules has also recommended an amended rule on confidentiality providing for greater
disclosure of client confidences than that proposed in Model Rule 1.6. See REPORT,
supra note 5, at 17-24.
There has also been some divergence from the Model Rules' proposed treatment
of advertising and solicitation. See, e.g., id. No. 44, at 961 (Sep. 18, 1985) (Delaware);
id. No. 42, at 924 (Aug. 21, 1985) (Missouri).
" KSCR 3.130. See also note 6 supra and accompanying text.
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ABA, however, amended the Code each year between 1974 and
1980 to reflect developing constitutional doctrine and perceived
shortcomings in the original Code. 45 Nonetheless, in an unpublished 1980 opinion, 46 the Kentucky Supreme Court announced

that the applicable Kentucky law remained the original 1969
Code with none of the ABA-approved amendments. 47 Thus,
generally unbeknownst to the public or the practicing bar, the
Kentucky Supreme Court adheres to a version of the Code that
the ABA revised in part soon after its adoption and abandoned
in total in 1983 . 48 Kentucky, therefore, has more ground to make
up than most states to bring its regulation of legal ethics in line
with contemporary ABA thinking.
Beyond that, however, Kentucky's adoption of the Model
Rules would also help remedy several significant defects in the
state's regulation of legal ethics. These defects prevent the present system from fully accomplishing the objectives of the lawyer
disciplinary process.
The regulatory process, of course, should control the professional status of those unable or unwilling to abide by a sound

4 Many of these amendments were reactions to United States Supreme Court cases
regarding first amendment restrictions on lawyer advertising and solicitation. See, e.g.,
notes 28-29 supra; CODE DR 2-101 (publicity) (amended 1978); id. DR 2-102 (professional
notices, letterheads and offices) (amended 1980); id. DR 2-103 (recommendation of
professional employment) (amended 1977); id. EC 2-2 to EC 2-5 (recognition of legal
problems) (amended 1977); id. EC 2-7, EC 2-9, EC 2-10, EC 2-11, EC 2-14 (selection
of a lawyer) (amended 1977). Other amendments, however, reach matters outside of that
realm. See, e.g., CODE DR 3-102 (sharing legal fees with non-lawyers) (amended 1980);
id. DR 5-105 (conflicts of interest) (amended 1974); id. DR 7-102(B) (disclosure of fraud)
(amended 1974); id. DR 7-110 (contact with officials) (amended 1974); id. DR 8-103
(lawyers as judicial candidates) (amended 1974); id. EC 7-34 (gifts to judges) (amended
1974).
. Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Wilkey, No. 80-SC-671-KB slip op. (Ky. Dec. 16, 1980).
This case is discussed further at Gaetke & Casey, Kentucky Law Survey-Professional
Responsibility, 70 Ky. L. J. 325, 339-40 (1981-82).
41 No. 80-SC-671-KB, slip op. at 3-4.

41

Since 1984, volume 9 of Baldwin's
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has contained a reproduction of the original 1969 version of the Code. Prior to that
time, that version was generally unavailable to practicing lawyers in Kentucky.
Note that the Kentucky Supreme Court has dealt with certain shortcomings of the
original Code in light of the developing constitutional case law on advertising and
solicitation by adopting its own advertising rule. KSCR 3.135. See notes 28-29 supra.
Similarly, the Court has adopted its own rules on group legal plans, KSCR 3.475, and
prepaid legal services, KSCR 3.476.
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body of minimal ethical standards. This is accomplished by
reprimanding or banishing from the profession individuals who
violate those minimal standards. The process, however, should
also serve two additional functions. First, it should provide
guidance to conscientious members of the profession who seek
counsel regarding their ethical responsibilities. Additionally, the
process should provide sufficient information to the general
public, the ultimate beneficiaries of the regulatory system, to
satisfy them that regulation of the legal profession is working
fairly and effectively.
Presently two defects in the Kentucky disciplinary process
prevent the accomplishment of these two important functions.
First, the Kentucky Supreme Court has been almost totally unwilling to adjudicate disciplinary cases under specific disciplinary
provisions, basing their decisions instead upon broad, nearly
meaningless catch-all provisions. 49 Second, the Supreme Court
persistently uses unduly abbreviated, conclusory opinions, which
provide little or no information to the public or to the practicing
bar. 0 The Model Rules' adoption could play a major part in
the reformation of these shortcomings.
When adopting the Code as the law applicable in Kentucky,
the Court declared that lawyers in this state could be disciplined
for violation of the Code and for any "other unprofessional or
unethical conduct tending to bring the bench and bar into disrepute."" On its face, it seems that such broad language merely
serves the useful purpose of filling the inevitable gaps created
by any reasonably brief codification of regulatory principles for
a complex profession. 2 The Kentucky Supreme Court, however,

See notes 51-54 infra and accompanying text.
:'See note 57 infra and accompanying text.
KSCR 3.130.
The Code, of course, contains its own catch-all language to cover inappropriate
conduct not specifically prohibited by the Disciplinary Rules. A lawyer may be disciplined
for illegal conduct involving moral turpitude, fraudulent conduct, conduct prejudicial to
the administration of justice, and other conduct that indicates a lack of fitness to
practice law. CODE DR 1-102(A)(3)-(6). Because Kentucky has adopted the Code, these
catch-all provisions are applicable to lawyers practicing in the state.
The additional catch-all language utilized in the Kentucky Supreme Court's rule
adopting the Code, however, goes much further than DR 1-102(A). See KSCR 3.130.
The Kentucky catch-all language is concerned less with the actual nature of the ethical
41
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prefers to use that broad, catch-all language to dispose of nearly
every case of lawyer discipline, whether a specific Code provision
applies to the conduct involved or not.13 The result is totally
unsatisfactory from a regulatory standpoint. Such an approach
results in a post hoc form of regulation that provides absolutely
no guidance to lawyers looking to the Court's decisions for
counsel as to the meaning of the Code. In fact, the approach
renders the Code's adoption nearly meaningless because one
cannot even look confidently to the Code provisions themselves
for assistance with ethical problems.5 4 The adoption of the Model
Rules and the simultaneous abandonment of this unfortunate
reliance upon vague catch-all language for disposing of disciplinary cases, therefore, would result in substantial improvement
in the regulatory process. 5 Of course, such an improvement will

transgression than with the effect of the conduct upon the bar's public image. Furthermore, the Kentucky language focuses upon the mere tendency of the conduct to affect
that image rather than its actual effect. See id.
" Between 1980 and November 1, 1985, only 4 of 32 reported lawyer disciplinary
cases even refer to Disciplinary Rules or Ethical Considerations. See Kentucky Bar Ass'n
v. Fitzgerald, 652 S.W.2d 77 (Ky. 1983); Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Tiller, 641 S.W.2d 421
(Ky. 1982); Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Gangwish, 618 S.W.2d 176 (Ky. 1981); Kentucky
Bar Ass'n v. Heleringer, 602 S.W.2d 165 (Ky. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1101 (1931).
The most glaring recent example of this deficiency in the Court's treatment of lawyer
disciplinary cases is the unpublished opinion in Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Smith, No. 33SC-144-KB (Ky. July 5, 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct 514 (1984). The Court's failure
to utilize the applicable Code provisions in Smith is soundly criticized in Van Booven,
Kentucky Law Survey-ProfessionalResponsibility, 73 Ky. L.J. 449, 454-58 (1984-85).
54It is possible that the court might consider certain conduct implicitly authorized
by the Code to be unprofessional or unethical conduct tending to bring the bench and
bar into disrepute. This is particularly true when pre-Code case layw using the same
catch-all standard is more stringent than the Code's treatment of identical conduct. The
Author has urged this point in detail using the field of solicitation as an example. See
Gaetke, Solicitation and the Uncertain Status of the Code of ProfessionalResponsibility
in Kentucky, 70 Ky. L.J. 707, 709-13, 722-24 (1981-82).
5 Compared to the Code, the Model Rules pare down the use of catch-all language
substantially. Compare CODE DR 1-102(A)(3)-(6) with MODEL RULES Rule 8.4(b)-(d).
However, the catch-all language used by the Kentucky Court is far broader than that
employed by the Code. See notes 52-54 supra. Adoption of the Model Rules in Kentucky,
therefore, would undoubtedly result in an even greater reduction in the potential for
reliance upon such vague, catch-all provisions.
Some states have expressed reluctance to adopt the new Model Rules because it
would require the abandonment of extensive case law interpreting the Code provisions.
See, e.g., I Law. Man. Prof. Conduct, supra note 3, No. 48, at 1047-48 (Nov. 13, 1935)
(Oregon). There is some evidence that similar sentiments exist within the Kentucky Bar
Association. Address by Michael M. Hooper, Assistant Director, Kentucky Bar Associ-
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be realized only if the Court also commits itself to careful
application and construction of the Model Rules' specific provisions.1 6 Their adoption, however, would be a large step in the
right direction.
The second defect in Kentucky's regulation of lawyers' ethics, the frequent use of conclusory, uninstructive opinions in
disciplinary cases,5 7 creates two possible, divergent implications.
One, likely to occur to anxious lawyers reviewing such decisions,
is that the Court dispenses discipline in an arbitrary fashion
without regard for public accountability. The other, more likely
to be felt by the general public, is that lawyer discipline is
dispensed in a club atmosphere where courtesy to members
prohibits the public discussion of indiscretions. One can only
hope that both implications are erroneous, but who can be
certain in the face of the current judicial practice? Surely the

ation, to Professional Responsibility Class, University of Kentucky College of Law
(October 18, 1984). It seems, however, that the one advantage Kentucky has from its
historical use of vague, catch-all language is the relative lack of such case law to abandon.
4 In its unpublished opinion in Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Wilkey, No. 80-SC-671KB, the Court did urge the bar association to state its charges in future disciplinary
cases in reference to precise Code provisions rather than the catch-all language of KSCR
3.130. No. 80-SC-671-KB, slip op. at 3. The Court's opinions since then, however, do
not evidence any greater usage of Code language by the Court. See note 53 supra; Van
Booven, supra note 53, at 449-50.
" See, e.g., Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Regan, 692 S.W.2d 632 (Ky. 1985); Kentucky
Bar Ass'n v. Brutscher, 678 S.W.2d 788 (Ky. 1984); Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Reed, 675
S.W.2d 2 (Ky. 1984); Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Gregory, 659 S.W.2d 204 (Ky. 1983). This
characteristic has been noted by the Author in Gaetke & Casey, supra note 46, at 326
n.6, and has been reiterated by another commentator. See Van Booven, supra note 53,
at 449-50.
Indeed, an additional criticism might be offered. The Court also seems unduly
predisposed to issue the most important disciplinary decisions in unpublished form. For
example, in Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Smith, No. 83-SC-144-KB, the Court addressed the
pervasive problem of conflicts of interest arising out of lawyers' business transactions
with clients and simultaneous representation of clients with potentially adverse interests.
Id. See Van Booven, supra note 53, at 454-58. Despite the importance of the Court's
views regarding such practices, the Court chose to present them only in an unpublished
opinion. Similarly, in Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Wilkey, No. 80-SC-671-KB, the Court
announced that it applied only the 1969 version of the Code with none of the ABA's
numerous amendments since that time. Id., slip op. at 3-4. See also notes 46, 56 supra.
Although critically important to the practicing bar, the opinion was not published. It
seems that the Court's use of unpublished opinions for some of the most important
decisions and its publication of brief, summary opinions, is doubly unproductive. For a
criticism of the practice of issuing unpublished opinions, see Render, On Unpublished
Opinions, 73 Ky. L.J. 145 (1984-85).
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Court must recognize that the regulated parties, here lawyers,
need to know what conduct has resulted in discipline. Likewise,
the public needs to know the facts surrounding disciplinary cases
to be assured that the Court is doing a fair and effective job of
enforcing the profession's norms. The Court's adoption of the
Model Rules would not necessarily accomplish these essentials
of the regulatory process. To the extent adoption compelled the
Court to describe carefully the conduct involved and to apply
and construe the new provisions, however, the opinions would
undoubledly be more informative and better serve the obnectives
of the regulatory process.
Rectifying these shortcomings would require the unequivocal,
public adoption of a body of sound substantive law and its
careful application and construction in published opinions that
adequately describe the conduct at issue. Adoption of the Model
Rules could be the first step in such a reformation of legal ethics
regulation in Kentucky.
CONCLUSION

Kentucky, along with the other states currently using the
Code, has the opportunity to improve considerably the regulation of legal ethics by adopting the ABA's proposed Model
Rules. The Model Rules, while subject to legitimate criticism,
constitute a substantial improvement upon the Code both in
form and substance.
More is to be gained by adopting the Model Rules in Kentucky, however, than in the other Code states. Adoption should
signal the end of the Kentucky Supreme Court's persistent reliance upon vague catch-all language rather than precise regulatory
provisions in disciplining lawyers. The Model Rules' adoption in
Kentucky could also serve as the impetus to abandon the regular
issuance of conclusory opinions offering no guidance to the bar
or public as to the conduct involved.
While the adoption of the Model Rules would go far in
remedying the defects in Kentucky's present regulation of legal
ethics, it would surely not be enough. The Kentucky Supreme
Court must make a new commitment to the task. This is not to
say that the Court has been insincere in its efforts to date. By
most appearances, in fact, the contrary is true. In an area as
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critical to the public and to the public esteem of the bar, however, more is needed than sincerity and good intentions. A
genuine commitment to the establishment of a sound regulatory
program for lawyers is needed. The public expects it. Lawyers,
of all people, should demand it.

